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AN INDIGENOUS PACIFIC HUMAN 
RIGHTS MECHANISM: SOME 
BUILDING BLOCKS 
Valmaine Toki* and Natalie Baird** 
This article explores the possibility of  a Pacific regional human rights mechanism, in particular in 
regard to how the rights contained in such a mechanism should be framed. It provides a case study 
of the New Zealand seabed and foreshore legislation and its impact in New Zealand as well as the 
CERD Committee's reaction to the challenge to that legislation.  Secondly, the article using the case 
study as a starting point, discusses the importance of an indigenous "lens" to develop the 
composition of rights in a Pacific regional mechanism. 
I INTRODUCTION 
As Pacific peoples1 we are defined by our culture and our custom. Wickliffe states:2  
No one can ignore the central role culture plays in determining the way people in the Pacific relate to 
each other and their communities … it reflects the values and norms of Pacific societies … it can either 
assist or hinder the promotion and protection of human rights. 
The exact composition and requirements of a Pacific regional human rights mechanism (PRM) 
are unclear and remain to be developed in the months and years ahead. However, human rights 
experts suggest that any such mechanism must be underpinned by universal human rights; rights 
  
*  Lecturer in Law, Law Faculty, University of Auckland. 
**  Lecturer in Law, Law Faculty, University of Canterbury. 
1  "Pacific peoples" in this paper refers to the people of the sixteen member states of the Pacific Islands 
Forum: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, 
Niue, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu. 
2  C Wickliffe "An Overview of Human Rights Developments in the Pacific Region with an Emphasis on the 
Collective Right to Self Determination" in N Tomas (ed) Collective Human Rights of Pacific Peoples 
(International Research Unit for Māori and Indigenous Education, University of Auckland, Auckland, 1998) 
168. 
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that are identified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR)3 and other 
international standards.4 These universal rights would inform the content of the PRM. Although it is 
envisaged that universal human rights are to be a floor rather than a ceiling,5 this creates a challenge 
for Pacific peoples, as universal human rights standards are not sourced from custom, but primarily 
from Western values. Inevitably a tension arises between maintaining local values and customs and 
implementing universal human rights. This will be a significant challenge to be met in developing a 
PRM. Ultimately, for the PRM to be culturally legitimate, robust and viable in the long term, it must 
reflect the wisdom of both custom and human rights.  
This article focuses on two sets of issues – procedural and substantive – that, in our opinion, are 
important with respect to the viability and robustness of the PRM. Part I addresses two preliminary 
matters of context. We begin with a case study of a recent New Zealand experience with some of 
the mechanisms of the international human rights framework. This case study informs our 
subsequent analysis and assessment of what we think are some of the important elements to be 
included in the PRM. In order to set the issues in their theoretical context, we then look briefly at 
the debate between universalism and cultural relativism.  
Parts II and III look at the two sets of "building blocks" which we see as essential in developing 
a culturally legitimate, robust and viable PRM. Part II looks at the first set of issues – the processes 
and procedures involved with developing a mechanism. First, we suggest that an indigenous starting 
point is required so that other issues important to a Pacific understanding and application of human 
rights are considered. Following on from this, we make some suggestions about the need for wide 
participation in the development of the PRM. We address the importance of human rights education, 
both as the PRM is developed and once it is up and running. Part III of the article considers a second 
set of building blocks that are more concerned with the substantive content of the PRM. We 
consider three matters which are likely to require inclusion in the PRM itself. These are group rights 
in addition to individual rights, the possibility of individual duties alongside rights, and whether 
decisions of the PRM should be binding. 
II CONTEXT 
A A Salutary Case Study: Foreshore and Seabed in Aotearoa New Zealand 
Before setting out our suggestions for a PRM, we begin with what we think is a salutary case 
study of both the promise and pitfalls of the international human rights framework. This case study 
  
3  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) UN Doc GA/Res/217A (III) [UDHR].  
4  P I Jalal "Why Do We Need a Pacific Regional Human Rights Commission?" in this volume. 
5  K Boyle "The European Experience" (Strategies for the Future: Protecting Rights in the Pacific, Apia, 27-29 
April 2008) oral comments. 
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has directly informed our analysis and assessment of what we think are important elements to be 
considered in any PRM.  
In New Zealand, despite intense national opposition to the Foreshore and Seabed Bill, 
Parliament passed legislation in 2004 vesting the foreshore and seabed in the Crown. The strongest 
grounds for challenging the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (FSA) lay in the right to freedom from 
discrimination. New Zealand is a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).6 Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu asked the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the CERD Committee), to consider the 
FSA against New Zealand's obligations under CERD. The CERD Committee issued a report in 
March 2005.7 
The CERD Committee reviewed the compatibility of the FSA with the provisions of CERD in 
the light of information received from both the Government of New Zealand and a number of non-
governmental organisations, and taking into account its general recommendation No. XXIII on 
indigenous peoples. In noting the political atmosphere, the haste with which the legislation was 
enacted, insufficient consideration to alternative responses which might have accommodated Māori 
rights within a framework more acceptable to Māori and other New Zealanders, and the scale of 
opposition, the CERD Committee stated that the foreshore and seabed legislation, on balance, 
discriminated against Māori by extinguishing the possibility of establishing Māori customary title 
over the foreshore and seabed, and by failing to provide a guaranteed right of redress.8 The 
Committee suggested that the Crown resume dialogue with Māori and try to find ways of lessening 
the discriminatory effects of the FSA, including where necessary through legislative amendment.9 
However, the New Zealand Government (and most other political parties except the Māori Party 
and the Green Party) dismissed the report. The Government belittled the report by suggesting it was 
unimportant and the CERD Committee did not really understand the complexity of the issue. It was 
also suggested that even if there were some "discriminatory aspects" in the FSA, this did not 
  
6  International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (21 December 1965) 660 
UNTS 195. 
7  Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination "Decision 1 (66): New Zealand 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004" (11 March 2005) CERD/C/66/NZL/Dec.1. 
8  Ibid, point 6. 
9  For further discussion, see Claire Charters and Andrew Erueti "Report from the inside: the CERD 
Committee's Review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004" (2005) 36 VUWLR 257; Nin Tomas (ed) 
Update on Foreshore and Seabed developments since 2004 Editor's note (2007) 2 Te Tai Haruru Journal of 
Māori Legal Writing 138. 
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necessarily mean a breach of CERD; in fact any evidence of discrimination is a breach of 
international law.10 Unsurprisingly, the report did not prompt any change in governmental policy. 
In November 2005, following Government criticism of the report issued by the CERD 
Committee, Professor Stavenhagen, a Mexican researcher, and the United Nations' Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
Peoples, arrived in New Zealand at the invitation of the Government. His final report was completed 
in March 2006.11 It was highly critical of the Government in a number of areas, including the FSA. 
The report recommended that the FSA should be repealed or significantly amended.  
The Government's response to this further criticism was again negative. It was suggested that 
Professor Stavenhagen's report was unimportant and did not really address the complexity of the 
issue. The (then) Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Michael Cullen, claimed that the report was 
unbalanced without providing any evidence as to what that meant.12 Nevertheless, the Stavenhagen 
Report is the product of the United Nations, the world's most important international human rights 
institution, and it has become glaringly obvious to the United Nations' top human rights official, the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, that New Zealand is in breach of the fundamental laws that 
it expects its own citizens to uphold.13 Moana Jackson argues that "for New Zealand to belittle a 
report that is the product of the most important international human rights institution there is; is to 
belittle the very notion of human rights."14  
The third chapter in this case study was the July - August 2007 review of New Zealand's 
performance in implementing CERD. The CERD Committee considered New Zealand's 15th-17th 
periodic report at its 71st session in Geneva. The Government was required to explain not only its 
response to the March 2005 CERD report but also answer questions on the status of the Treaty and 
Māori participation in decision-making. The CERD Committee repeated its previous findings and 
suggested renewed dialogue between the Crown and Māori about the FSA. However, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs dismissed the CERD Committee as "meddlesome."15 
  
10  Moana Jackson "The United Nations on the Foreshore: A Summary of the Report of the Special 
Rapporteur" www.converge.org.nz/pma/mj050406.pdf (accessed 16 May 2008). 
11  ECOSOC "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Mission to New Zealand" (13 March 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3.  
12  Jackson, above n 10. 
13  Tomas, above n 9, 139. 
14  Jackson, above n 10. 
15  See comments made by Te Ururoa Flavell, available at www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/e/6/5/48HansD_20070822_00000769-General-Debate.htm (accessed 16 May 
2008). See also www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0708/S00387.htm (accessed 16 May 2008). 
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This case study highlights a number of issues. A universal human rights approach for Māori, 
while achieving some success, is ultimately not delivering much in the way of concrete benefits. 
Although Māori succeeded in accessing international human rights mechanisms, and those 
mechanisms found in their favour, the actual outcome for Māori was no change to the status quo. A 
number of questions are raised. Why is the international human rights framework ultimately not 
delivering for Māori? Does the existing international human rights framework adequately take 
account of the perspectives and position of indigenous collectives? Has the very framing of human 
rights somehow excluded the Māori perspective? Does the existing framework allow for sufficient 
participation by indigenous groups? How viable and robust is the international human rights 
framework when a state can simply ignore recommendations with impunity? Finally, would a 
Pacific regional mechanism have ensured a better outcome for Māori in this situation?  
B  The Theoretical Context: Universalism and Cultural Relativism 
The international human rights movement has, throughout its history, since the adoption of the 
UDHR in 1948, been plagued by allegations that the way in which human rights are understood and 
defined is a Western one. This debate, most well known by its universalist and cultural relativist 
proponents, is part of the underlying context for our subsequent discussion of key procedural and 
substantive building blocks for the PRM, so we summarise it briefly here. 
Those who adopt the universalist viewpoint claim that international human rights like equal 
protection or free speech must be the same everywhere. This is perpetuated with universal terms 
contained within human rights treaties such as "everyone has the right," "all persons," "no one". 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms contained in the UDHR irrespective of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion.16 The text of these basic instruments 
makes no explicit concession to cultural variation.17  
Pacific scholar Konai Helu Thaman considers that:18  
Such assumptions were at best naïve and at worst arrogant, because most international covenants are 
based on Western liberal beliefs and values, and like all beliefs and values, they are embedded in a 
particular cultural agenda where indigenous peoples together with their assumptions and values have 
been and continue to be disregarded and marginalised. 
Supporters of the universal application of human rights reject the claim that if human rights 
norms conflict with cultural practices, the particularity of the culture should take precedence over 
  
16  UDHR, above n 3, art 2. 
17  H J Steiner and P Alston International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1996) 193. 
18  K H Thaman "Cultural Rights: A Personal Perspective" in M Wilson and P Hunt (eds) Culture, Rights, and 
Cultural Rights: Perspectives from the South Pacific (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2000) 1, 3. 
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the universal standard.19 Universalists claim that an objective yardstick must be used to measure 
behaviour and allowances should not be made for cultural variation. To think otherwise is said to 
challenge the validity of human rights (and the belief that all humans are equal and therefore entitled 
to equal protection) and retard the development of universal standards.20  
Cultural relativists on the other hand consider that notions of right (and wrong) and moral rules 
necessarily differ throughout the world because the cultures in which they inhere themselves differ. 
Human rights depend on a cultural context or a cultural situation or background. Notwithstanding 
the view that everyone is entitled to basic human rights such as the right to life and to be free from 
violence, relativists situate human rights in a cultural context. 
The cultural relativist holds that human rights norms ought to be subject to culture.21 The 
advocates of cultural relativism claim that rights and rules about morality are encoded in and thus 
depend on cultural context. The term "culture" is used in a broad and diffuse way that may go 
beyond indigenous traditions and customary practices to include political and religious ideologies 
and institutional structures.22 Critics of the universal application of human rights challenge the 
assumption that international human rights should be applied universally on the basis that the 
perception and valuation of rights is culturally partial, and that practices that are valid according to a 
particular culture should not be overridden by "outsiders."23  
Cultural relativism challenges the very substance and basis of human rights as a eurocentric 
approach that ignores the diversity of world cultures.24 Universal human rights are seen as 
reflecting values and norms of Western culture. This is a broad use of the term "culture" beyond 
indigenous traditions to include political, religious and institutional structures. When the UDHR was 
adopted in 1948, it was against a very different backdrop which may have limited any reference to 
collective rights or culture. It was a time where unity and stability were paramount and references to 
culture could have been perceived as support for culturally fanatical ideologies and group rights 
such as those perpetrated by Nazism. Equally though, it is significant to note that at the time of its 
  
19  K Johnston "Māori Women Confront Discrimination: Using International Law to Challenge 
Discrimination" (2005) 4 Indigenous Law Journal 19, 51. 
20  Ibid. 
21  See for example Ermineskin Cree Nation v Canada (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal) [2001] AJ No 1187 
ABQB 760 (QL) where the Sawbridge Indian band totally rejected the application of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act to its community on the basis that it was unconstitutional to the extent it infringed their 
Aboriginal treaty rights (self determination). 
22  Steiner and Alston, above n 17, 192. 
23  C MacKinnon Sex Equality (New York Foundation Press, 2001) 471. 
24  R Commaraswamy "Different but Free: Cultural Relativism and Women's Rights a Human Rights" in 
Courtney W Howland (ed) Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women (St Martins Press, 
New York, 1999) 79. 
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adoption, there were only 56 member states of the United Nations, and large parts of the world, 
including much of the Pacific, were still colonised.  
 
In recent years however, there has been a convergence of the universalist and cultural relativist 
camps. For example, the Vienna Declaration 1993 states:25  
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated… While the significance 
of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be 
borne in mind it is the duty of the States regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to 
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
We support this convergence of views and take a pragmatic approach. We see ourselves as 
neither universal nor relativist, but culturally pragmatic. Drawing on the ideas of writers such as 
Abdullahi An Na'im26 and Sally Engle Merry,27 and endorsing the approach taken by the New 
Zealand Law Commission,28 we instead argue for an approach which seeks to understand, interpret 
and apply human rights in the Pacific context. We seek an approach that aims, explicitly and 
unambiguously, to ensure that human rights in the Pacific are "culturally legitimate."29 This will 
require drawing on both traditional values and customs and human rights.  
III PROCEDURAL BUILDING BLOCKS  
A Why Adopt an Indigenous Lens? 
We propose that an indigenous starting-point to develop the composition of rights within the 
PRM is essential.30 It is clear that the international human rights framework has not yet caught the 
 
25  World Conference on Human Rights "Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action" (25 June 1993) 
A/CONF.157/23 para 5. 
26  See Abdullahi An Na'im (ed) Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: Quest for Consensus, 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1992). 
27  See S E Merry "Changing rights, changing culture" in Jane K Cowan, Marie-Benedicte Dembour and 
Richard A Wilson (eds) Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001); S E Merry Human Rights and Gender Violence, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
2006). 
28  New Zealand Law Commission Converging Currents: Custom and Human Rights in the Pacific (Study 
Paper 17, Law Commission, Wellington, 2006) paras 5.40-5.57. 
29  Abdullahi An Na'im uses the language of "cultural legitimacy" and argues for an approach which identifies 
the lack of cultural support for some human rights and then seeks ways to support and legitimise the 
particular human rights in terms of the values, norms and processes of the particular culture. See Abdullahi 
An-Na'im "Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights" in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im 
and Francis M Deng (eds) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (The Brookings Institution, 
Washington, DC, 1990) 331, 339. 
30  Throughout this paper we use the term "indigenous." While it was tempting to attempt an explanation of our 
use of this term, this would be a separate article in itself, and we have not attempted an abbreviated version 
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"hearts and minds" of Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs). Tony Angelo once 
suggested that in the Pacific islands human rights is an alien concept, born substantially from the 
Western European political experience as a development of a European notion of law.31 This may 
be reflected by the reluctance of some PICTs to sign up to and ratify international human rights 
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights32 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.33 From the Pacific island members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum, only the Cook Islands, Niue, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are 
party to ICESCR; and the Cook Islands, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Vanuatu are party to 
ICCPR. 
The expectation for PICTs to sign and ratify international human rights covenants is seen by 
Thaman34 as yet another form of external intervention when Pacific peoples are already reeling 
from a suffocating Western, and perhaps more recently Eastern,35 economic domination. The low 
level of PICT engagement with the international human rights framework suggests that the PRM 
should not simply be a Pacific reflection of the international framework. To be a robust and viable 
mechanism for promoting and protecting human rights, it needs to be something more.  
Vaá suggests a way forward when he notes that the concept of human rights contained in the 
UDHR is foreign to Samoan ways of thought. According to Vaá:36 
Whereas modern European notions of human rights derive from Christian theological principles, such as 
those spelt out in Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Natural Rights, and the libertarian and egalitarian 
principles, such as those stated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the 
equivalent ideas in Samoa emanate from custom. 
As one Pacific scholar has commented, "why should the Pacific have a human rights 
mechanism? Whose assumption is this? If it is the Pacific Islands' idea then great, go ahead."37 
  
here. We simply note that the term is complex and often contextual. Within the Pacific, as elsewhere, 
particular issues around indigeneity vary in different contexts. We hope that the contexts in which we use 
the term in this article assist in understanding. 
31  AH Angelo "Lo Bilong Yumi Yet" in Essays and Documents on Human Rights in the Pacific (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1992) 33. 
32  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 [ICCPR]. 
33  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966) 993 UNTS 3 
[ICESCR].  
34  Thaman, above n 18, 2. 
35  See discussion in R Crocombe Asia in the Pacific Islands Replacing the West (IPS Publications, Fiji, 2007). 
36  U Vaá "Samoan Custom and Human Rights: An Indigenous View" in this volume. 
37  K Hay "A Pacific Human Rights Mechanism: Specific Challenges and Requirements" in this volume. 
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Of particular note in this context is the initiative of the LAWASIA organisation in the late 
1980s. LAWASIA, a private organisation of individuals and law firms in the Asia Pacific region, 
proposed a draft Pacific Charter of Human Rights.38 Jalal notes that in addition to political and 
social reasons why PICTs did not support earlier attempts to establish a PRM:39 
Most importantly the initiative was perceived to be driven by outsiders and not Pacific Islanders … this 
is a salutary warning to all of us here, that if this initiative is seen to be driven by outsiders, no matter 
how well intentioned or sensitive to Pacific Islanders and their concerns, the initiative will fail. 
Colonial history can also not be overlooked. The legacy of Government policies and practices 
have systematically disadvantaged and oppressed indigenous peoples.40 In the Pacific constitutional 
context, Malifa offers the following insight:41 
The adoption of constitutions in the South Pacific has focussed more on gaining independence from 
political control than on ensuring the legitimacy of a particular constitution as supreme law which 
mandates a new beginning.  
Mikaere argues that the prime reason for the current status of Māori is colonisation; so why 
should Māori seek salvation in the principles of law that have been formulated by colonisers?42 
This is not to reject absolutely any rights-based discourse. Rather, it indicates that it is illogical for 
indigenous peoples to turn unquestioningly to Western legal concepts for answers to problems that 
have been brought into their lives by the imposition of Western law. These past historical 
injustices43 strongly suggest that the starting-point for the PRM should be an indigenous one. 
More recent post-colonial events also suggest the importance of an indigenous starting-point. 
On 13 September 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP).44 DRIP is the most important, comprehensive and 
  
38  See "Appendix 1: Report on a proposed Pacific Charter of Human Rights prepared under the auspices of 
LAWASIA, May 1989" (1992) 22 VUWLR 99. 
39  Jalal, above n 4. 
40  See D Williams Te Kooti Tango Whenua (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 1999) for discussion of the 
successive Native Land Acts and alienation of Māori land.  
41  T Malifa "The Rights Conflict in the Constitutions of the South Pacific: Seeking Toleration into the 21st 
Century" in N Tomas (ed) Collective Human Rights of Pacific Peoples (International Research Unit for 
Māori and Indigenous Education, University of Auckland, Auckland, 1998) 119. 
42  A Mikaere "Collective Rights and Gender Issues: A Māori Women's Perspective" in N Tomas (ed) 
Collective Human Rights of Pacific Peoples (International Research Unit for Māori and Indigenous 
Education, University of Auckland, Auckland, 1998) 79.  
43  See discussion on decolonisation and calls for independence of Pacific nations in Wickliffe, above n 2, 153. 
44  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007) UN Doc 
A/RES/61/295. 
 
224 (2009) 40 VUWLR 
progressive international instrument to address indigenous peoples' rights within the international 
human rights framework. As a declaration, DRIP is not legally binding on states45 but is important 
as a standard-setting document for states and indigenous peoples. Although Australia and New 
Zealand had been deeply involved in various phases of the drafting over the years, both countries, 
along with Canada and the United States, voted against adoption of the Declaration. The voting of 
PICTs was also disappointing. Only the Federated States of Micronesia voted in favour of DRIP. 
Samoa abstained, and the remaining PICTs were absent.46 
In light of both colonial and more recent events, we agree with Sir Paul Reeves that:47 
We must build human rights on the foundation of our own cultural heritages. Human rights law is 
something that belongs to Pacific peoples because it arises from within our contextual frameworks and 
reflects our experiences.  
In our opinion, culture provides a lens through which any investigation, understanding and 
debate on human rights should proceed. According to Vaá, human rights in Samoa "do not exist by 
themselves but are embedded in the culture and are attached to social action."48 Adopting this 
approach will assist to ensure any sensitivities to culture are prioritised. We suggest that it is 
through the lens of Pacific peoples that any such mechanism should be developed. This in itself 
does not exclude future engagement with the international human rights framework, but it 
recognises and affirms the standing of Pacific peoples and the unique nature of the Pacific region. 
B Participation 
Once an indigenous starting-point is established, in our opinion, each Pacific nation, and civil 
society from each nation, should fully participate in the development of the PRM. Hay is of the 
view that "[t]here is an understandable need for a majority of Pacific states to be in support of the 
  
45  S Errico "The UN General Assembly adopts the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" ASIL 
Insight (2007) 10 (19) 1 www.asil.org/insights/2006/08/insighths060814.html (accessed 31 May 2008). See 
also J Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2 ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004) 61-
72, for arguments that declarations can reflect customary international law. 
46  Department of Public Information, United Nations "General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples; "Major Step Forward" towards human rights for all, says President" (13 September 
2007) Press Release www.un.org/Newz/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm (accessed 24 August 2008). 
47  P Reeves "Collective Human Rights of Pacific Peoples" in N Tomas (ed) Collective Human Rights of 
Pacific Peoples (International Research Unit for Māori and Indigenous Education, University of Auckland, 
Auckland, 1998) 12. 
48  Vaá above n 36. 
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development of a regional human rights mechanism if it is to have any chance of success."49 
Further:50 
To advance the concept of a regional human rights mechanism it will be critical for both political and 
civil society actors to not only support its developments but be involved in the processes that determine 
the institutional arrangements. 
In order to secure support for the PRM, meaningful participation is key. Wickliffe also 
identified that all Pacific peoples should be represented in all forums to discuss and ultimately 
implement a PRM.51 If each Pacific nation participates and is instrumental in developing the PRM 
this would arguably induce a wider co-operation. Boyle states that:52 
In the context of the Pacific region it is important to underline that a regional human rights mechanism 
needs to have the co-operation of states and an intergovernmental institution within which the 
mechanism operates. What above all is needed is the political will of states to agree to such a 
mechanism, to fund it and to implement its decisions or recommendations. 
A particular issue is whether Australia and New Zealand should be involved in the development 
of the PRM. One of the concerns raised by Jalal was:53 
My primary focus is on Pacific Island countries and territories … Australia and New Zealand each have 
well functioning institutions and for practical reasons should not be included in the initial regional 
mechanism although options for them to join later should be made available. 
One of the underlying reasons we suggest an indigenous Pacific lens stems from concern as to 
the continuing effects of colonisation. We, too, are concerned that any mechanism adopted is not, in 
either perception or reality, received as a neo-colonial imposition by Australia or New Zealand. 
However, if an indigenous Pacific lens is adopted right from the outset, then this should assist to 
allay any anxiety that the involvement of Australia and New Zealand will produce a neo-colonial 
overtone.  
In our view, it is especially important that indigenous Australians and New Zealanders be able 
to participate in the development of the PRM. As noted above, both New Zealand and Australia 
voted against the adoption of DRIP. This illustrates how out of step New Zealand and Australia 
have become with the international community on indigenous issues. This is an added reason why 
  
49  Hay, above n 37. 
50  Ibid, 15.  
51  C Wickliffe "Human Rights Education in the Pacific" (1999) 3 Journal of South Pacific Law, Working 
Paper 1 available at www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj (accessed 15 May 2008). 
52  K Boyle "The European Experience: The European Convention on Human Rights" in this volume. 
53  Jalal, above n 4, 2-3.  
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there should be participation by New Zealand and Australian Indigenous groups. The DRIP 
experience and the Māori experience with the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 highlight the need to 
adopt an indigenous starting-point for any proposed PRM. This will require strong leadership from 
within the Pacific community and commitment to ensuring human rights and custom are 
compatible. 
C Human Rights Education 
The third procedural building block which we see as important to ensure a culturally legitimate, 
robust and viable PRM is human rights education. As Thaman noted ten years ago, "[h]olistic 
human rights education, both formal and non-formal, will be a necessary ingredient of any human 
rights awareness initiative in the region."54 Further, according to Wickliffe:55 
Some attempt to harmonise principles of the Pacific cultures with the need to promote and protect 
human rights must be made. This will only be achieved through good human rights education. 
There are two time-frames of relevance. First, as any PRM is developed, human rights education 
is a necessary adjunct to ensuring sound participation (discussed above), and engendering culturally 
legitimate substantive content of any mechanism (discussed below). Secondly, human rights 
education is ongoing and so will continue to be important once the PRM is adopted and 
implemented. 
Within the international human rights framework, human rights education is sometimes seen as 
a right in and of itself, based on the requirement in the United Nations Charter for states to promote 
and encourage respect for human rights.56 The aim is to ensure that people are aware of their rights 
in order that they can exercise them. A related element is ensuring that officials in the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of government are also aware of human rights so that their laws, 
policies, practices and judgments are in conformity with human rights. 
In order for human rights education to succeed, it needs to be tailored to the local cultural 
context. This is important because otherwise there is a risk that the zeal of human rights advocates 
in enthusiastically promoting human rights will undermine the palatability of their message. To 
avoid this risk, human rights education needs to meet the requirements of the particular audience. 
The success of human rights education about the PRM will depend in large part on the extent to 
which the PRM is seen as owned by the peoples of the Pacific.  
  
54  Thaman, above n 18, 9. 
55  Wickliffe, above n 2.  
56  See for example Rhona K M Smith Textbook on International Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007) 297. 
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Our view of human rights education is however broader than simply tailoring the human rights 
message to the local culture. We are concerned not only with training, dissemination and 
information efforts. We conceive of human rights education as being something more dynamic and 
collaborative. In our view, the aim of human rights education should go beyond dissemination of 
information about human rights and contribute to achieving a "cultural synthesis" that makes human 
rights "right" for Pacific peoples.57 One commentator has noted that perhaps the flaw in the 
LAWASIA initiative was that not enough space or resources were provided to ensure that Pacific 
peoples could internalise and own the discourse of human rights.58  
Culture is significant here. Culture can be a barrier or the key to embedding a human rights 
culture in the Pacific. According to Wickliffe:59 
There is a need to advance the discussions on human rights in the Pacific by illustrating the relevance of 
human rights and values to all Pacific peoples. As culture pervades the entire way of life of all Pacific 
peoples, [culture] is the answer to promoting respect for human rights and advancing the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard. 
Thaman suggests that in order for human rights to be understood by and acceptable to Pacific 
Island communities, it must take into account the value contexts and cultural perspectives of those 
communities.60 Thaman also reminds us that Pacific culture is not monolithic. Therefore, culture 
should be used to investigate, question and understand existing and proposed human rights 
standards in order to ensure that the sensitivities which Pacific states seek from the international 
community are accorded to the different cultural communities in their own countries.61 
These ideas are echoed by scholars such as Sally Engle Merry. Merry suggests that the debate 
between universalism and relativism is premised on a fixed and abstract conception of both culture 
and rights, but that in fact both concepts are fluid and changing. She describes the struggle of 
women human rights activists in the Solomon Islands seeking to create a space which incorporates 
both cultural differences and transnational conceptions of human rights. The aim of such activists is 
to attain the strength of the international rights framework, without its individualising, Western 
implications and alienation from their own local cultural understandings.62  
  
57  Thaman, above n 18, 9. 
58  Wickliffe, above n 51, 6. 
59  Ibid, 7.  
60  Thaman, above n 18, 4. 
61  Ibid, 8. 
62  Sally Engle Merry "Changing rights, changing culture" in Jane K Cowan, Marie-Benedicte Dembour and 
Richard A Wilson (eds) Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001) 31-32. 
 
228 (2009) 40 VUWLR 
We suggest that a similar aim is likely to be relevant as the PRM is drafted and implemented, 
particularly in the context of human rights education. We, too, believe in, on the one hand, the 
capacity of the human rights system to adapt to the cultural context, and, on the other hand, the 
potential for culture and custom to be enhanced by human rights. Each one can, and should, inform 
the other. In our view, human rights education in support of the PRM should be undertaken in this 
context. Not only should human rights education enable dissemination of knowledge about the 
international human rights framework and the PRM, but human rights education should also 
"provide opportunities for Pacific peoples to develop a regional philosophy of rights and 
responsibilities."63 
IV SUBSTANTIVE BUILDING BLOCKS 
Jalal states that:64 
The Charter should reinforce the universal rights established by international human rights instruments 
but should also be expanded to recognise rights and duties that are peculiar to PICTs. In giving 
recognition to these rights and duties, care should be taken to ensure that they do not conflict with or 
whittle down universal rights. 
In our view, there are two key substantive issues which, taking into account the Pacific cultural 
context, need to be considered in the development of the PRM – group rights and duties. While it 
will be challenging to incorporate both of these without whittling down universal rights, in our 
view, both should be aimed for as they are likely to be essential in ensuring cultural legitimacy of 
the mechanism.  
A Group Rights  
A basic tenet of indigeneity is the concept of the collective. Pacific and indigenous cultures are 
defined by their culture and underpinned by a collective or group ethic set on a framework of 
whakapapa (genealogy, cultural identity) and the related interconnectedness between all humans and 
the environment. This underpinning ethic is central to a Māori world-view. The world-view of 
indigenous peoples is noted as:65 
[A] distinctive view of reality, which not only interprets and orders the places and events in the 
experience of a people, but lends form, direction, and continuity of life as well. World view provides 
people with a distinctive set of values, an identity, a feeling of rootedness, of belonging to a time and 
place, and a sense of community with a tradition which transcends … even time. 
  
63  Wickliffe, above n 51, 7. 
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The concept of the collective is not well understood by Pakeha lawmakers and has not 
traditionally played a prominent role in the international human rights framework which tends to 
reflect an individualistic approach, such as is evident in the UDHR.66 Thaman was critical of 
LAWASIA's Pacific Charter:67 
The draft Pacific Charter … is still very much a European document and there is still concern in some 
quarters that attempts to contextualise it in order to reflect collective rights may be abused if people 
(meaning groups) don't understand the basis for these collective rights. 
The international human rights framework is, however, increasingly beginning to recognise 
group rights and human rights of indigenous peoples.68 DRIP explicitly provides that indigenous 
peoples have the right to full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms "as a 
collective or as individuals."69 Collective rights recognised in DRIP include the right to self-
determination,70 the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples,71 and 
the right to practice and revitalise cultural traditions and customs.72 Some domestic constitutions 
also recognise group rights. The Constitutions of the Federated States of Micronesia73 and Fiji74 
both expressly recognise group-based customary law rights. The Draft Federal Constitution of the 
Solomon Islands 2004 includes a number of provisions that expressly recognise the rights of clans 
and tribal village communities including rights to maintain and develop their laws and customary 
practices and to pursue their economic development.75 
In our view, it is important that the PRM recognise core values intrinsic to indigenous Pacific 
cultures such as the importance of the collectivity. There are two aspects to recognition of group 
rights. First, the recognition of rights of groups themselves. The precise content of these will be 
determined as the PRM is developed. However, the examples given above from DRIP and the Draft 
Federal Constitution of the Solomon Islands may provide a useful starting point.  
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Group rights can not only be recognised in and of themselves, but can also inform interpretation 
and implementation of "individual" rights. This second aspect of group rights enables culturally 
influenced forms of implementation of basic rights such as the right to a fair trial.76 For instance, in 
New Zealand the marae is sometimes used as a suitable forum to deal with Māori offenders.77 This 
is known as "marae justice" where responsibility is focussed upon the collective rather than the 
individual in a setting that is culturally consistent with tikanga Māori and kaupapa Māori. 
Due process and procedural fairness involve the principle that the Government respects all of a 
person's legal rights (including tikanga) instead of just some or most of those legal rights when the 
government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. So the right of an individual to seek a fair 
trial, declared in the UDHR, may, in some contexts require the consideration of a cultural element to 
satisfy procedural fairness. In this instance, for Māori, a fair trial may require a hearing on a marae. 
There are similar experiences around the Pacific. In Samoa, consideration of cultural elements 
such as ifoga is required for procedural fairness. Samoan courts take into consideration ifoga during 
sentencing as a mitigating factor and in many instances the prescribed sentence is reduced.78 This 
consideration of a culturally specific custom is at the discretion of the courts. In Tonga, although the 
Constitution does not explicitly recognise custom, an academic commentator has observed that in 
criminal proceedings, the hearing, charges and issues are usually framed and discussed in terms of 
Tongan custom and the obligations arising from significant village relationships.79 Similarly, in 
Australia, for Indigenous Australians, legislation directs consideration of indigenous sentencing 
practices. The Magistrates (Koori Court) Act 2002 provides for the establishment of a Koori 
Division of the Magistrates Court and defines the jurisdiction and procedure of the Koori Division. 
Notably, Australian jurisdictions that have established Koori Courts to deal with sentencing of 
Aboriginal peoples have yielded far lower recidivism rates.80  
In our view, the idea of group rights merits careful consideration as the PRM is developed. Both 
the notion of stand-alone group rights and the separate notion of interpreting and applying 
individual rights in their collective context are worthy of further consideration.  
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B Duties 
A second substantive matter that is likely to be necessary to ensure a culturally legitimate, 
robust and viable PRM is the inclusion of the duties of individuals as well as their rights. The 
human rights framework is primarily concerned with the rights of individuals and the duties of 
states to guarantee those rights. There is, however, an identifiable Pacific concern that the singular 
focus of the human rights movement on individuals develops excessive individualism and is 
detrimental to societal cohesion. Bernard Narokobi, a leading Papua New Guinean statesman and 
scholar expresses his concern:81 
Human rights without effective social obligations are a curse on our lands. Human rights, at least in 
Papua New Guinea, have become 'laik bilong wan-wan' – the 'wish of the individual.' The overall impact 
of human rights on our societies has become one of self-destruction. We give to ourselves the right to be 
lazy, steal, rape, commit adultery, disobey legitimate authority, ignore those in need, abuse our elders, 
debase our cultures, exploit our own people, keep them in perpetual serfdom, blaspheme, commit 
sacrilege against our ancestors and against God. 
The Pacific concern mirrors an international concern at the consequences of excessive 
individualism. Two recent initiatives are of particular note. In 1997, the Inter Action Council (IAC) 
proposed a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities. The IAC noted its concern that 
"exclusive insistence on rights can lead to endless dispute and conflict."82 It sought to balance 
individual freedom with individual responsibility and in so doing promote "a move from the 
freedom of indifference to the freedom of involvement."83  
The second international initiative concerning duties built on the IAC's initiative. In 2003, the 
Commission on Human Rights released the final report of Special Rapporteur Miguel Alfonso 
Martinez on human rights and human responsibilities.84 In his report, Martinez noted that there was 
a "North-South" polarisation on the issue of duties, with developed countries of the North opposing 
the formal recognition of any correlation between rights and responsibilities and those of the 
underdeveloped South acknowledging the important connection between the two.85 He also stated 
his view that in order to advance further in the field of human rights, it was necessary to create and 
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develop a new individual and collective awareness of the need to find a solid balance between the 
rights of the individual and his or her social responsibilities.86 Special Rapporteur Martinez's report 
annexed a "Pre-Draft Declaration on Human Social Responsibilities" but this did not proceed any 
further through the United Nations system. 
If it was agreed that the PRM should recognise an individual's duties as well as their rights, the 
question arises as to what type of duties it might be appropriate to recognise. While this is a matter 
requiring considerable further work in order to reflect Pacific values, some preliminary comments 
can be made.  Although, as noted above, the international human rights framework is primarily 
concerned with the rights of individuals and not their duties, it does, when one looks closely, 
contain some recognition of duties. For example, the preamble to the UDHR provides that "every 
individual and every organ of society … shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect 
for these rights and freedoms." Paragraph 5 of the Preamble to both ICCPR and ICESCR provides 
that "…the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, 
is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognised in the 
present Covenant."  
Individual duties are sometimes recognised implicitly in the context of particular rights. For 
example, in the context of the right to freedom of expression, ICCPR article 19(3) provides that the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression "carries with it special duties and responsibilities." 
More broadly, article 29(1) of the UDHR provides that "[e]veryone has duties to the community in 
which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible."  
The human rights treaty with the most extensive recognition of duties is the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (the Banjul Charter).87 The Banjul Charter, with its emphasis on the 
collective and community as well as the individual, is of particular interest in the Pacific context. 
Three articles set out the duties of individuals. Article 27(1) provides that "[e]very individual shall 
have duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognised communities and 
the international community." Article 27(2) concerns how an individual is to exercise his or her 
rights and provides that rights are to be exercised "with due regard to the rights of others, collective 
security, morality and common interest." Article 28 requires the individual to "respect and consider 
his fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, 
safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance." Article 29 lists a number of specific 
duties. Duties to one's family include the preservation of the harmonious development of the family, 
respecting one's parents and maintaining them in case of need. Duties to the community and the 
state include serving the national community by placing one's physical and intellectual abilities at its 
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service, preserving and strengthening social and national solidarity, and positive African cultural 
values. 
Some domestic constitutions also recognise duties.88 An example is the Constitution of Vanuatu 
1980, which recognises a number of non-justiciable fundamental duties.89 The duties are expressed 
as being owed to oneself, one's descendants and others, and include the duties to respect and to act 
in the spirit of the Constitution, including exercising one's rights and participating in the government 
of Vanuatu. Duties to the nation include actively participating in the development of the national 
community, safeguarding the national wealth, resources and environment in the interests of the 
present generation and of future generations, and working in socially useful employment. A parent 
is required to support, assist and educate their children, including giving them an understanding of 
their fundamental rights and duties, the national objectives and the culture and customs of the 
people of Vanuatu. A child is required to respect his or her parents. 
There are a number of potential advantages for the PRM to recognise duties. The IAC saw its 
Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities as a means of "reconciling ideologies, beliefs and 
political views that were deemed antagonistic in the past"90 – in essence, greater recognition of 
responsibilities might assist in addressing some of the cultural relativist concerns with the human 
rights movement. In the Pacific context, recognition of duties alongside individual rights might 
serve a similar function in the sense of making adoption of a human rights instrument acceptable to 
those who worry that human rights is a neo-colonialist enterprise. A related advantage is that 
individual rights can then be seen in their broader context. Recognising duties alongside rights more 
clearly recognises cultural values of reciprocity and community and situates the individual within 
his or her community. Vaá notes that in Samoa, traditional notions of human rights are expressed in 
the responsibilities and obligations of individuals to their kin, affinal and non-kin groups.91 In the 
customary Pacific context, duties and obligations underpin daily life.92 The inclusion of duties 
alongside rights recognises this, and would give the PRM a distinctive Pacific character.  
It has also been noted that inclusion of duties such as the duty to support elderly parents and 
family members may be of particular use in those states like PICTs which have underdeveloped 
economies, and no, or limited, social security systems.93 A related issue concerns the reach of the 
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state into the lives of individuals. In some customary communities in the Pacific, the state has very 
little involvement in the lives of individuals. Instead, it is customary leaders who have the primary 
role in terms of regulating the lives of individuals. Imposing duties on individuals, including 
customary leaders, to respect the rights of others, may therefore ultimately assist in better protecting 
the rights of all individuals. A rights framework which fully recognises the roles, rights and 
responsibilities of the individual, the customary community and the state may better reflect the 
reality of life in small Pacific communities.  
There are however some possible disadvantages if the PRM recognises duties. A major concern 
is that authoritarian states may use duties to suppress human rights. For example, those who seek to 
challenge corruption may be seen as breaching their duties to the state. At a community level, 
individual duties owed to the family or community might be misused in order to maintain power 
relationships that are unequal and based on duress.94 Attribution of duties to individuals within the 
community according to criteria such as age, sex and hierarchical status may reinforce oppressive 
structures such as patriarchy. Ultimately, the concern with recognising duties in the rights context is 
that they will undermine individual rights and detract from the dignity of the individual.  
The potential disadvantages of explicitly recognising duties in the PRM must be carefully 
considered. A PRM which undermined rights by recognition of duties would be a disastrous 
outcome. However, the potential risks of recognising duties may perhaps be mitigated by explicitly 
noting, as does the Vanuatu Constitution,95 that the duties are to be non-justiciable. Duties could 
then be used in the context of human rights education – ensuring that individual rights are seen in 
their wider context. They could also be used as aids to interpretation of rights, or perhaps as the 
basis of a reporting mechanism monitoring the way in which the notion of a communal ethic is 
operating in society.96  
C A Binding Mechanism 
One of the major shortcomings of the international human rights framework is its weak 
enforcement mechanisms. This is illustrated by the Māori experience with the challenge to New 
Zealand's foreshore and seabed legislation. Despite success in international human rights fora, with 
no commitment by the domestic Government, there was – in the end – no effective remedy for 
Māori. 
Although the enforcement mechanisms in the international human rights framework are weak, 
in the regional European human rights system, there are stronger enforcement mechanisms. The 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),97 was adopted under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe in 1950 to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. All Council of Europe 
member states are party to the Convention and new members are expected to ratify the ECHR at the 
earliest opportunity. 
The ECHR established the European Court of Human Rights. Since 1998, with the entry into 
force of Protocol 11 to the ECHR, the individual complaint process became compulsory for all 
states that are party to the ECHR. Any person who feels their rights have been violated under the 
ECHR by a state party can take a case to the Court. Procedural requirements before the Court will 
consider a case include the exhaustion of available domestic remedies. The decisions of the Court 
are legally binding, and the Court has the power to award damages. The establishment of a judicial 
mechanism, accessible by individuals, to provide protection from human rights violations is an 
innovative feature for an international convention on human rights. It gives the individual an active 
role in the international arena, where traditionally international law only recognised states as actors. 
The ECHR is still the only international human rights agreement providing such a high degree of 
individual protection.  
In our view, for the PRM to be a robust means of protecting and promoting human rights, it 
needs to have strong enforcement mechanisms. Ultimately, decisions of the PRM should be binding 
on member states. Ideally, the PRM would be eventually incorporated into each legal system of 
member states, and domestic courts would recognise judgments from the PRM. This would 
minimise the risk of a state ignoring with impunity the considered views of the PRM. 
However, such a concession of national sovereignty, especially for PICTs wary of the 
international human rights movement, may be too great a leap of faith at the outset. We note, 
however, that there has already been some discussion around the possibility of a general regional 
Pacific appellate court which may indicate this concern is misplaced.98 Nevertheless, small steps 
may be required before a legally binding mechanism is adopted. A regional human rights 
commission with recommendatory powers could be an appropriate starting point. A regional 
commission could itself work with Pacific nations to adopt and develop a legally binding 
mechanism. 
In our view, if an indigenous perspective is adopted and there is effective participation from 
Pacific nations, then over time, as with the ECHR, it is not unforeseeable that Pacific nations could 
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accept and respect the judgments of the PRM and implement them accordingly. In the long-term, 
particularly in light of the Māori experience with the international human rights framework over the 
foreshore and seabed controversy, a mechanism with the power to issue legally binding judgments 
is a necessary ingredient for a robust PRM.  
V CONCLUSION 
A Pacific regional human rights mechanism offers huge – and exciting – potential for advancing 
the cause of human rights in the Pacific. However, the lessons from the negative impacts of past 
practices and colonisation on Pacific Peoples should not be forgotten. Rather than have the content 
and scope of a Pacific human rights charter pre-determined by existing understandings of human 
rights, it is suggested that an indigenous starting point should be adopted. It is through an 
indigenous lens that any such mechanism should be developed and it is an indigenous starting point 
that will ultimately ensure a culturally legitimate, robust and viable human rights mechanism for the 
Pacific. 
Using an indigenous lens, this article has suggested some building blocks for the mechanism. In 
addition to the indigenous lens, two other procedural building blocks are essential. Effective 
participation of all Pacific nations and civil society within those nations is required. Human rights 
education, both during the development of the mechanism and once it is operational, and undertaken 
with a willingness to seek a "cultural synthesis" of rights appropriate for the Pacific context is also 
important.  
We suggest three substantive building blocks which are likely to be important for the cultural 
legitimacy of the Pacific mechanism. Recognition of group rights in addition to individual rights is 
likely to be necessary to situate individual rights within their collective context. The possibility of 
individual duties alongside rights will also require careful consideration. Although the prospect of a 
legally binding mechanism may seem daunting, in our view, in order to ensure strong protection of 
rights, decisions from the regional mechanism should be binding. It is, however, acknowledged that 
small steps may be initially required, with a binding mechanism a longer-term goal. In a perfect 
world, a Pacific regional human rights mechanism which is truly indigenous is not beyond reach. 
However, it is acknowledged that the road ahead to achieve a culturally legitimate, robust and viable 
regional mechanism for the Pacific is not without potholes and deceptive curves.  
 
